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ABSTRACT:  Borrower level data from over 1,000 agricultural lending relationships are 
used to examine how several factors influence the costs and returns of extending 
agricultural credit.  The characteristics of agricultural borrowers and their demand for 
various financial products and services are described.  The results also provide estimates 
of the costs and returns of agricultural lending and the extent to which these costs and 
returns are influenced by factors such as loan volume, lender/borrower relationship 
factors, and contract terms.  The results indicate that economies of size exist in 
agricultural credit delivery and that lenders pass most of these benefits on to borrowers 
through lower interest rates.  The length of the lender/borrower relationship also 
influences the costs and returns of lending.  Unlike loan volume, it does not appear that 
lenders pass the benefits of reduced servicing and monitoring costs to borrowers through 
lower rates.   
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The Costs and Returns of Agricultural Credit Delivery  
 
Introduction 
The competitiveness of the modern agricultural production sector is dependent upon large 
amounts of low cost capital.  Many agricultural lenders have begun to examine the lending 
programs used to provide this capital in efforts to find more cost effective means of credit 
delivery.  Additionally, efforts underway to standardize credit risk reporting, such as suggested 
by the New Basel Accord, combined with consolidation in the banking industry have caused 
lenders to re-examine their approaches to credit risk rating and agricultural lending (Barry).  To 
effectively supply debt capital within this environment, lenders must have an accurate 
understanding of the costs and returns of delivering credit to agricultural borrowers and be 
convinced that agriculture remains an attractive lending sector.   
Although the amount of debt capital used by farms exceeded $200 billion in 2002 
(Economic Research Service), agricultural lending is specialized and unique from many other 
types of commercial lending.  Agricultural borrowers do not typically prepare audited financial 
statements, often pledge large amounts of fixed assets as collateral, and have highly variable cash 
flows due to weather and price fluctuations.  Furthermore, changes in the production agriculture 
sector have significant implications for lenders.  Farm consolidation has led to larger loan 
volumes and a concentration of risk within the typical loan portfolio.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that consolidation has also altered the market power of the large agricultural borrower, 
allowing larger borrowers to negotiate lower interest rates and demand more and better financial 
services.  However, few rigorous studies have been conducted regarding the actual costs and 
revenues generated by serving an individual agricultural borrower.   
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Previous research has examined how a variety of factors influence the rates paid on non-
agricultural loans (Petersen and Rajan, Berger and Udell, Blackwell and Winters, Degryse and 
Cayseele, Elsas and Krahnen).  Much of the theoretical reasoning used to motivate these studies 
focused on how characteristics of the lender/borrower relationship should influence the costs of 
credit delivery.  However, data limitations forced researchers to rely on competitive market 
assumptions and infer the impact of cost factors through their impact on interest rates.  This 
approach does not allow one to examine the specific types of costs or cost categories that are 
influenced.  When observing the cost impact through rates, one can only conclude that total costs 
are impacted and can say little about the specific types of costs that are impacted.  For instance, 
little is known regarding the extent to which loan servicing and origination costs vary with loan 
volume.   In addition, the highly regulated nature of the lending process makes it possible that 
the perfect market assumption is only partially fulfilled.   
A clear understanding of the factors that influence the costs and revenues generated by 
agricultural borrowers should result in efficient credit delivery, thereby reducing the cost of 
credit for agricultural producers.  Lenders can use this information to set interest rates, establish 
loan fees, price financial services, and develop new methods to efficiently supply credit to all 
types of borrowers.  In addition to management considerations, policymakers have and continue 
to develop a variety of programs to encourage lending to specific types of farmers such as small 
or young and beginning farmers.  In order to assess whether these programs provide incentives of 
a proper magnitude, it is critical to understand the costs and returns associated with extending 
credit to farmers.   
This study makes a significant contribution by collecting and analyzing the data 
necessary to estimate the actual costs of extending credit at the borrower level and by examining 
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the case of agricultural lending.  Several insights about both the costs and revenues of extending 
credit at the borrower level are provided.  A unique data set of over 1,000 borrower records is 
used to examine how factors such as economies of size, credit risk, characteristics of the 
lender/borrower relationship, and financial product usage influence the costs and returns of 
agricultural credit delivery.   
In the next section, the process of lending is described highlighting the important 
economic aspects of the lending problem.  This information is used to develop a model that 
explains the factors thought to influence the costs, revenues, and profitability of serving 
agricultural borrowers.  Then the data are summarized and models are estimated to test the 
hypothesized relationships.  Finally, the results and conclusions are presented.   
 
Agricultural Lending 
Agricultural lenders establish relationships with potential borrowers, assess their 
creditworthiness, and serve as a conduit of funds from capital sources to borrowers and back.  In 
doing so, lenders incur costs for screening potential borrowers, monitoring borrowers to ensure 
timely repayment, and managing money flows.  A basic annual profit function for an agricultural 
loan relationship is given by (1). 
(1)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ωγψθα SWFCM +−+−= π  
where, π  is relationship profit, M is the interest rate margin or difference between the interest 
paid by the borrower and the institution’s cost of funds, C is the costs associated with monitoring 
and servicing the borrower, F is loan fees paid by the borrower, W is the amount of the 
borrower’s principle and interest obligation that is written-off by the lender, and S is the net 
income earned from providing non-loan financial services to the borrower.  Interest rate margin, 
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servicing costs, loan fees, write-offs and non-loan services are determined by a variety of 
economy, lender, and borrower characteristics represented by the vectors α, θ, ψ, γ, ω.   
While all of the components of the profitability equation are important, interest rate 
margins and servicing costs are arguably among the most important and least understood.  The 
analysis in this paper focuses on the interest rate margin, servicing costs, and profitability 
generated by an individual borrower or lending relationship.  The next section describes several 
factors that are hypothesized to influence interest rate margins and servicing costs per dollar of 
average daily loan balance (ADB) (Table 1).  Among the most important are the size of the loan 
or loan volume, borrower/lender relationship characteristics, credit risk, and the characteristics of 
the financial products and services used by the borrower.   
 
The Role of Loan Volume 
Previous research provides some evidence of a relationship between loan volume and the cost of 
lending to an individual borrower.  Using firm level data obtained from the Federal Reserve and 
surveys of agricultural lenders, Ellinger and Barry examined the costs of agricultural credit 
delivery.  They estimated that loan officer costs accounted for 85 basis points (85 hundredths of 
a percent) per dollar of loan volume.  Importantly, Ellinger and Barry observed that smaller 
banks, whose average loan volume per customer was smaller than that of larger banks, had 
greater labor costs per dollar of loan volume.   
One possible interpretation of this result is that the lender encounters economies of size at 
the borrower level such that providing credit to customers with large loan volumes is generally 
more cost effective than providing credit to customers with small loan volumes.  Providing 
further support for the idea that loan volume influences costs, Stanton examines the efficiency of 
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loan relationship managers and finds that they are more efficient when they are allowed to 
service fewer, large customers as opposed to larger numbers of small customers.   
Large loans might have lower average costs per dollar of loan balance than small loans 
because each loan relationship incurs expenses that are not completely variable.  For instance, 
the lender must prepare a loan recommendation, document the loan, secure any collateral, 
prepare a recommendation, etc.  To the extent that these processes are not variable with loan 
volume, the cost per dollar of loan balance declines with loan volume.  The magnitude of these 
cost advantages remains an important, but unanswered question.   
Potentially mitigating these costs savings is the fact that increasing loan volume 
concentrates credit risk.   As a result, the loan application tends to receive greater scrutiny by 
more people including loan officer supervisors and credit committees.  However, this scrutiny is 
also unlikely to be completely variable with loan volume.  In other words, it would seem unlikely 
that a $1 million loan would receive much less scrutiny than a $1.1 million dollar loan, but both 
would be subject to substantially more analysis than a $100,000 loan.  In total, servicing costs 
per dollar of loan balance are expected to decline with loan volume until increased credit risk 
monitoring costs off-set the savings from spreading fixed costs over greater loan volume.   
Like costs, it is reasonable to expect that loan volume should influence interest rate 
margin.  A slightly lower percentage margin on a much larger loan volume can result in larger 
total revenues and is a profitable strategy if average costs decline with loan volume.  Thus, a 
borrower seeking a large loan volume might use this to negotiate better rates resulting in a 
narrower interest rate margin.  However, the extent to which margin can narrow with size 
depends upon the servicing cost function.  It is anticipated that increasing loan volume will 
reduce interest rate margin and that the reduction will decline as size increases.   
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Several studies have examined issues related to interest rate margins.  Petersen and Rajan 
observe that larger borrowers pay lower interest rates, 59 basis points when firm size increased 
from the 25th size percentile to the 75th size percentile in their study.  Elsas and Krahnen and 
Blackwell and Winters also find evidence that larger firms borrow at more favorable rates.  
While there is some evidence regarding the direction of this impact, it is not clear how large this 
effect is for agricultural loans, and additional work is needed to examine the issue more 
carefully. 
 
The Role of Lender/Borrower Relationships 
Petersen and Rajan examined how characteristics of the lender/borrower relationship influenced 
both credit availability and interest rates.  They argue that stronger lending relationships, 
manifested by a longer duration lender/borrower relationship and greater numbers of products 
and services exchanged, should reduce lender costs.  Cost reductions might arise for a variety of 
reasons.  First, if lenders have more experience (a longer duration relationship) with the 
borrower, the lender has better information about their repayment history and a more accurate 
assessment of credit risk.  Likewise, when the borrower uses non-loan products and services such 
as deposits, brokerage, or consulting this simplifies monitoring by providing information to the 
lender regarding credit risk and repayment capacity.  Petersen and Rajan also explain that the 
concentration of a borrower’s debt with one lender should reduce monitoring costs and improve 
the lender’s control over the borrower’s business activities.  
Unfortunately, limited access to data at the relationship level has made it difficult to test 
hypotheses that costs are reduced by favorable relationship characteristics.  Instead, authors have 
relied upon efficient market arguments (assuming that any cost savings will be passed on to 
borrowers) and examined the impact of relationship factors on interest rates paid by borrowers.  
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For instance, Petersen and Rajan had data on rates, but no cost data.  They found that rates 
increase substantially (31 basis points) for each additional bank with which the borrower does 
business and that older borrowers tend to pay lower rates.  However, they did not find a 
relationship between the length of the borrower/lender relationship and interest rates or the use of 
financial services and interest rates.  Lenders may not convey all of the cost savings accruing 
from relationship benefits to agricultural borrowers as many farm borrowers do not regularly 
compare rates and services across lenders thereby reducing the lender’s incentive to provide 
more favorable rates (Gloy and LaDue).   
 Several studies have been conducted to examine the issues raised by Petersen and Rajan 
and all have focused on the impact on loan rates rather than on costs.  Elsas and Krahnen 
examine loan pricing using data from 200 German credit files.  Like Petersen and Rajan they 
found no evidence that the duration of the relationship is important.  However, when examining 
the premium that borrowers paid over the prime lending rate, Berger and Udell found that 
interest rates on lines of credit declined as the length of the relationship with the borrower 
increased.  The size of the estimated impact was 48 basis points for a 10 year increase in 
relationship length.  On the other hand, Degryse and Cayseele find that as relationship duration 
increased interest rates paid by small to mid-sized Belgian borrowers increased.  Finally, 
Blackwell and Winters examination of 174 lines of credit revealed no relationship between the 
length of the lender/borrower relationship and interest rates.  Although no empirical consensus 
has emerged with respect to the impact of relationship length on interest rates, one would expect 
that average costs would decline as the relationship lengthened.   
While Petersen and Rajan found no relationship between the use of multiple financial 
products, Degryse and Cayseele found that borrowers using two or more financial products and 
 
 
 
9
services tend to receive more favorable rates, up to 39 basis points.  For the case of borrower 
concentration, Elsas and Krahnen and Blackwell and Winters and Petersen and Rajan all found 
that increasing levels of concentration were associated with lower interest rates.   
There appears to be little consensus with respect to the empirical significance of 
relationship variables.  While most of the theoretical reasoning for the importance of these 
variables is based on cost arguments, none of the studies have examined actual credit delivery 
costs at the borrower level.  It is important to examine whether it is actually less costly to serve 
borrowers with stronger (longer, more concentrated, multiple product) relationships.  It is 
expected that the stronger the lender/borrower relationship the lower the average cost of serving 
the customer.   
 
The Role of Credit Risk 
Many of the costs of extending loans arise from trying to assess and protect against default risk.  
Although lenders are required to make allowances for loan defaults, there are relatively few 
studies that estimate the actual costs of default.  Featherstone and Boessen examine the default 
costs of agricultural mortgages.  Over the period of 1966 to 1985 they estimate default costs at 
29 basis points.  Because lenders face a higher expected default cost for riskier borrowers, they 
charge these borrowers higher rates.  For instance, Blackwell and Winters found that the average 
medium risk borrower pays 117 basis points over the prime lending rate and the average low risk 
borrower pays 23 basis points over the prime rate.  In addition to greater expected default costs, 
riskier borrowers also command greater monitoring resources.  However, research has not 
specifically addressed the magnitude of the increased servicing costs associated with high risk 
borrowers. 
 
 
 
10
 
Lender, Loan Product, and Loan Contract Characteristics  
Although lenders attempt to cover the increased likelihood of default with higher interest rates, it 
is expected that this risk/return trade-off will be viewed differently across lenders.  Lender 
underwriting and pricing practices should also influence interest rate margin and servicing costs.  
Using bank level data Bard, Barry, and Ellinger examined how factors such as bank size, credit 
risk, and location influence the interest rates offered by agricultural lenders.  Although they 
observe that banks with lower costs tend to offer lower average interest rates, they find that much 
of the variation in interest rates is difficult to explain at the bank level. 
Interest rate margin and servicing costs will also likely be influenced by the borrower’s 
primary agricultural enterprise.  Farm enterprises vary by the proportion of total assets that are 
long-term, length of business and cash flow cycles, yield and price variability, and availability of 
risk management tools.  Lenders may have differing degrees of expertise in lending to various 
types of agricultural enterprises such as dairy or permanent plantings.  If there are a small 
number of borrowers of one type, the lender might find it more difficult to assess the credit risk 
of the enterprise.  If the lender has expertise in dealing with borrowers producing specific types 
of agricultural commodities, one would expect them to experience lower servicing costs and be 
able to offer better rates to these types of borrowers. 
The type and duration of the loan instruments used by the borrower is expected to 
influence the interest rate margin and servicing costs.  Providing capital over a longer time frame 
brings greater uncertainty about the success of the enterprise, repayment, and the lender’s cost 
structure.  However, this uncertainty can be offset with higher quality collateral and lower 
servicing costs.  Short and intermediate term debts, such as lines of credit, require that the lender 
frequently monitor the operation and the ability of the borrower to repay debts. 
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Data and Method 
Borrower level data were gathered from six agricultural lenders.  The lenders represent both 
commercial banks and farm credit associations in the Northeastern United States.  The loan 
records of 963 borrowers were examined in 2001.  The portfolios were stratified by three loan 
volume categories and three risk categories to ensure adequate representation of loans from all 
size and risk categories (Table 2).  The low risk borrowers were identified as borrowers with 
loans that would not be classified by regulators, often referred to as “pass” loans.  Medium risk 
borrowers were identified by the regulatory classifications of special mention, substandard, or 
doubtful, and the highest risk borrowers were classified as non-accrual or loss borrowers.  
Borrowers placed in the highest risk category were typically at least 90 days past due on their 
interest and principal obligations for at least one loan, and many had experienced loan write-offs 
within the past year.  Borrowers were randomly selected from each strata resulting in low 
sampling rates for low risk borrowers and high sampling rates for high risk borrowers.   
Research associates worked with lender personnel to gather data on the costs and 
revenues generated by the borrowers.  The majority of the data were gathered from lender loan 
files and computerized loan records.  The loan officer in charge of each relationship also 
completed a questionnaire to determine the amount of time spent dealing with the borrower and 
characteristics of the borrower’s business that were not typically contained in the credit files. 
 
General Characteristics of Agricultural Lending Relationships 
The borrowers were sampled from a population of over 9,000 agricultural lending relationships.  
Because a stratified sampling procedure was utilized, it was necessary to weight the individual 
observations in order to develop estimates of the population means.  Some general characteristics 
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of these borrowers are summarized in Table 3.  According to their credit files, the average 
borrower had total assets of $990,376, a debt to asset ratio of 37%, and the primary operator was 
approaching 50 years of age.  The vast majority operated as sole proprietors (77%) and nearly as 
many were organized as family corporations as were organized in partnerships.   
The typical borrower maintained an average daily loan balance of $128,115.  Lenders 
were able to generate this amount of loan volume with a relatively small number of loan 
agreements (2.5).  However, some customers had substantially more loan agreements.  Short-
term loans (in excess of a year but less than 10 years) were the most commonly used loan 
agreements.  Annually renewed lines of credit were the second most popular type of loan 
agreement and accounted for 31% of the total ADB.  It should be noted that in most cases the 
ADB on a line of credit was considerably lower than the amount authorized by the loan 
agreement.  Variable rate loans are by far the most widely used type of rate structure, as only 
16% of the outstanding debt carried fixed rates.  When weighted by loan volume, the average 
term remaining on the debt was nearly 6 years.   
The lenders tended to hold a large proportion of each borrower’s total liabilities (50%), 
but this concentration of borrowing is considerably less than that estimated by Petersen and 
Rajan for the case of small businesses.  The lenders had established relatively long relationships 
with the borrowers, 8.2 years.   
 
Estimates of the Average Costs and Returns  
Data from the credit files and loan officer questionnaires were used to develop estimates of the 
direct costs and returns of agricultural lending (Table 4).  During the time period sampled the 
average borrower was paying a rate of 7.8%.  This was calculated by dividing the total interest 
paid over the year by the borrower by the borrower’s total average daily loan balance.  In order 
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to provide a measure of the cost of funds that was comparable across institutions, the one-month 
certificate of deposit (CD) rate was chosen as a benchmark to approximate the financial 
institution’s cost of funds. This proxy measure of interest expense was calculated by multiplying 
the one-month CD rate for the time period that the interest was earned by each borrower’s ADB.  
It was then subtracted from interest paid to find the interest rate margin over the one-month CD 
rate.  On average, the borrowers were paying 408 basis points above the one-month CD rate.  
The borrower’s tended to generate only modest amounts of loan fee income (24 basis points) and 
net financial services income (22 basis points).   
After the proxy for the cost of funds, personnel costs were the next largest cost category, 
accounting for 86 basis points per dollar of ADB.  This estimate is nearly identical to the loan 
officer cost estimated by Ellinger and Barry.  Write-offs and legal costs were estimated at 13 
basis points per dollar of ADB.  The estimate of write-offs is 8 basis points less than 
Featherstone and Boessen’s estimate.  This might reflect the fact that our estimates are based 
upon a much shorter time period and the time period considered was generally favorable for 
repayment.  After considering these direct costs the average lending relationship generated a 
return of 309 basis points over the one-month CD rate.  This return would need to compensate 
the bank for all overhead costs and personnel time not spent directly dealing with borrowers.     
 
Models 
Regression models were used to estimate interest rate margin per dollar of ADB (2), servicing 
costs per dollar of ADB (3), and relationship profitability per dollar of ADB (4).  In each case the 
dependent variable was recorded in basis points, e.g., 7.56% was recorded as 756 basis points.   
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where the β’s are parameters to be estimated, the ε’s are normally distributed error terms with 
mean 0 and variance σ2.  Table 5 describes the independent variables.  The models were 
estimated with ordinary least squares using SAS V8 (SAS Institute Inc.).  The parameter 
estimates and model fit statistics for the three models are shown in Table 6.  In all cases, the F-
statistic for the joint significance of the parameters is large enough to reject the hypothesis that 
the parameters explain no variation in the dependent variable.   
 
Results: Interest Rate Margin 
Interest margin is a critical component of lender profitability because it must be large enough to 
cover all of the expenses generated in the lending process and compensate the lender for credit 
risk.  The regression analysis indicates that loan volume, credit risk, contract characteristics, and 
relationship characteristics all have a significant influence on how lenders price credit (Table 6).   
 Interest rate margin decreases as loan volume increases until loan volume reaches 
approximately $3.6 million.  The decreases within this range are relatively large.  Other things 
equal, if loan volume increases from $100,000 to $400,000 the interest rate margin narrows by 
27 basis points.  The difference in interest rate margin between $100,000 of loan volume and 
$1,000,000 is 75 basis points.  Other things equal, many of the largest borrowers will have access 
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to credit at more favorable rates than their smaller peers.  There is also evidence of a loan 
volume threshold at which lenders are unwilling to continue to discount rates for the largest 
borrowers.  This might reflect the perception that economies of size in credit delivery are 
exhausted or reversed after $3.6 million dollars or it could indicate that lenders are less willing to 
manage the credit risk created by loan volumes of this magnitude.  It should be pointed out that 
some of the lenders would be unwilling to hold all of the credit risk created by loans of this 
magnitude in their portfolio.  Reducing this credit risk creates additional costs as the lender must 
engage in credit risk management activities such as selling participations in the loans.   
While larger borrowers tend to pay more favorable rates, borrowers with greater credit 
risk pay higher rates.  Medium risk borrowers pay a 39 basis point premium over low risk 
borrowers, and high risk borrowers borrow at 44 basis points over medium risk borrowers.  The 
low risk category contains borrowers that would not be classified by regulators. As a result, there 
is a relatively wide range of acceptable risk borrowers included in the low risk category and one 
would expect that even greater differentials would exist if measured against the highest quality 
borrowers.   The premiums are large in relation to the average write-offs and legal costs of 13 
basis points (Table 4).  However, the premiums must cover increased monitoring costs 
associated with problem loans as well as compensate the lender for increased credit risk.   
It was apparent that there are significant differences in the rate setting practices at the 
financial institutions.  The average spread between the lowest and highest rate institutions was 
nearly 400 basis points.  Although the markets served by these two lenders were different, it is 
surprising that such wide differences existed.   
The lenders in this sample tended to show a preference for dairy loans by offering these 
borrowers the best rates.  Dairy is the predominant agricultural industry in this region and the 
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favorable rates could reflect confidence in assessing credit risk in the dairy industry. Borrowers 
in the other agricultural loan (primarily agricultural service providers) and permanent plantings 
categories tended to borrow at the least favorable rates. One could argue that assessing credit risk 
for permanent plantings and other agricultural loans borrowers requires the ability to assess 
different types of business models and collateral.   
Two of the four relationship variables had an impact on loan pricing.  The longer that the 
lender had maintained a relationship with the borrower, the greater the interest rate paid.  The 
impact was relatively small but statistically significant.  An increase of 10 years would result in a 
13 basis point increase in interest rate margin, indicating that the lenders tend to extract a loyalty 
premium from their borrowers.  This would indicate that loyalty in the relationship tends to 
benefit the lender more than the borrower.   
Borrowers who concentrated their loan demands on one lender tended to receive better 
rates, although the impact is relatively small.  Increasing the proportion of debt borrowed from 
the lender by 10 percent would result in a 5 basis point reduction in the interest rate margin.  
While lenders reward borrowers for concentrating their loan volume, they did not tend to offer 
better rates in conjunction with the use of financial services.   
The contract terms or characteristics of the borrower’s debt also influenced interest rates.  
Borrowers with a greater proportion of debt in lines of credit tended to borrow at more favorable 
rates, but the impact was quite small.  Because lines of credit are frequently refinanced it is likely 
that these borrowers are able to exert buying power on the lender.  Likewise, borrowers using 
fixed rate instruments tended to generate lower margins for the lender1.   
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Results:  Servicing Costs 
While the interest rate margin and loan fee results represent the impact of pricing strategies, the 
servicing cost results reflect the impact of operational strategies.  The regression results are 
generally consistent with expectations (Table 6).  As loan volume increases, per unit costs fall 
until loan volume reaches $3.7 million.  As with interest rate margin, the average cost 
differentials for loans of different sizes can be dramatic.  Other things equal, the average 
servicing costs fall by 19 basis points as loan volume increases from $100,000 to $400,000.   
Although lenders experience average cost savings by extending larger credits, it is 
particularly interesting that the estimated cost decline is less than the estimated decline in interest 
rate margin.  Figure 1 shows the estimated impact of loan volume on servicing costs and interest 
rate margin. The cost declines and interest rate margin reach a minimum at nearly the same level 
of loan volume.  However, lenders tended to price the loan volume much more aggressively than 
the declines in servicing costs would support.  For smaller loans the impact of this difference is 
relatively small, but it is substantial for larger loan volumes.  For instance, at a loan volume of 
$100,000 the difference between the cost impact and the interest rate margin impact is only 4 
basis points, but at $2 million dollars the difference is 43 basis points.    
While the average cost per dollar of loan volume declined with size, the average 
servicing costs for low and medium risk loans were not different at a meaningful level of 
statistical significance.  This indicates that there is little difference between the average 
monitoring costs associated with monitoring the credit risk of these types of borrowers.  The 
average servicing costs are much greater for high risk borrowers (98 basis points) than for the 
other borrowers.  These costs arise as the lender must closely monitor the borrower and spend 
considerably more time working with the borrower to ensure repayment.  It was also apparent 
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that obtaining new customers was considerably more costly than servicing existing customers.  
The average costs were nearly 60 basis points per dollar of ADB greater for new borrowers than 
for existing low risk borrowers.   
While lenders offered borrowers from several industries more favorable rates, little 
evidence emerged that servicing costs varied by industry.  Similarly, the variability in servicing 
costs across lenders was not as great as the variability in rates charged by the various lenders.  
This would suggest that the monitoring and servicing procedures followed by the lenders were 
similar.   
As was the case for interest rate margin, relationship length and concentration had 
significant impacts on servicing costs.  While relationship length tended to increase interest rate 
margin, it reduced servicing costs.  This would provide evidence to substantiate the claim that it 
is less costly to service borrowers with a longer history with the lender.  However, the size of the 
impact is quite small.  Each additional year of relationship length only reduced servicing costs by 
1 basis point.  As a result lenders likely have a difficult time observing meaningful cost benefits 
associated with longer lending relationships.  Borrowers who tended to obtain a larger proportion 
of their credit from one lender were also less costly to serve, but again the impact was quite 
small.  It is possible that this impact indicates that the lender is the borrower’s lender of choice.  
If this is the case, the borrower would be more likely to approach the loan officer when 
additional capital is desired, rather than the loan officer having to sell the borrower on the lender.  
The magnitude of both the relationship length and concentration impacts would suggest 
that they have observable, but economically unimportant impacts on the costs of delivering 
agricultural credit.  Likewise, there is no evidence that monitoring costs are less for borrowers 
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that utilize financial services.  This result would lead one to question whether meaningful cost 
synergies exist between lending and various other financial services.   
The contract terms and types of loans used by the borrowers had little impact on the cost 
of servicing agricultural loans.  The exception was for the average term remaining on the debt.  
Borrowers with more years remaining on their debt were slightly less costly to serve. 
 
Results: Relationship Profitability  
The profitability model examines the net impact of the factors identified in the interest rate 
margin and servicing cost models (Table 6).  The dependent variable for this model considers 
loan write-offs, fees and other expenses that were not considered in the interest rate margin and 
servicing cost models.  At this level most of the relationships disappear as cost savings are off-
set by reduced margins.  For instance, loan volume does not have a meaningful impact on the 
average profitability generated by the lending relationship.  In fact, only lender practices and risk 
have meaningful impact on relationship profitability.  This result is not surprising given the wide 
differences in interest rate margin across the lenders.  The most profitable lender had the greatest 
interest rate margin and the lowest servicing costs.  The large negative impact of credit risk on 
profitability is not unexpected.  Although these borrowers generate a greater interest rate margin, 
they are also more costly to service.  When write-offs are also considered these borrowers 
become very unprofitable. 
 
Conclusions 
This study examined how several factors influence the costs and returns of extending agricultural 
credit.  Based on analyses of borrower level data, the results provide estimates of the costs and 
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returns of agricultural lending and the extent to which these costs and returns are influenced by 
factors such as loan volume, lender/borrower relationship factors, and contract terms.   
 The study estimated the interest rate margin generated by agricultural loans as the net 
earned interest rate less the cost of the one-month certificate of deposit rate.  The estimate of the 
average interest rate margin for agricultural loans was 408 basis points.  The study did not 
estimate the total costs of extending credit, but rather focused on the direct costs of extending 
credit such as loan officer time spent with the customer.  The average relationship incurred direct 
personal costs of 86 basis points per dollar of average daily balance (ADB) and write-offs of 13 
basis points per dollar of ABD.  The average net return over the one-month certificate of deposit 
rate and these direct costs was 309 basis points per dollar of ADB.   
 Loan volume has important impacts on the average cost of servicing agricultural loans.  
The average cost of extending and monitoring credit fell until loan volume exceeded $3.6 
million.  Other things equal, it is substantially more cost efficient to serve borrowers with larger 
loans.  However, the results also indicate that lenders aggressively price these cost savings.  In 
fact, as loan volume increases interest rate margin falls faster than servicing costs.  The net 
impact was that loan volume has little impact on profitability per dollar of average daily loan 
balance.  However, because of real cost savings and competition for large credits, it is likely that 
larger borrowers will be able to achieve lower costs of capital than their smaller peers.   
The apparent presence of substantial economies of size will continue to provide an 
incentive for banks to make larger loans.  This economic pressure is countered by the 
concentration of risk that accompanies larger loans.  It is likely that financial institutions will 
face continuing pressure to consolidate so as to increase their ability to extend larger credits.  
Additionally, innovations in credit markets which allow agricultural lenders to sell credits 
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through participations will work to offset this risk and create increased competition for large 
credits.   
Credit risk influenced both costs and interest rate margin.  The costs of servicing and 
monitoring medium risk borrowers were not significantly greater than the costs of servicing low 
risk borrowers.  However, medium risk borrowers generated substantially higher interest rate 
margins.  These margins help to protect the lender from the likelihood that the borrower 
transitions to the highest credit risk category.  The riskiest borrowers were substantially more 
costly to service and monitor and were charged the highest rates.  After considering loan write-
offs it appears that the risk premiums may not be large enough to compensate lenders for the 
costs of this risk.  Further examination is needed to assess whether the default premiums 
accurately assess both the probability and magnitude of potential losses associated with default. 
Servicing costs and interest rate margin differed widely by lender.  Additional work is needed to 
examine the various management practices employed by the lenders and to measure their 
associated returns.   
The impacts of several lender/borrower relationship characteristics were examined.  The 
length of the lender/borrower relationship was one of the most important relationship 
characteristics.  As it increased, servicing and monitoring costs fell.  As opposed to loan volume, 
it does not appear that lenders pass this benefit on to borrowers through lower rates because 
interest rate margin increased as relationship length increased.  The proportion of the borrower’s 
total debt that was extended by the lender or concentration of borrowing was another important 
relationship variable.  As concentration increased, costs fell.  Unlike relationship length, the 
lenders pass this benefit to their borrowers through reduced interest rate margins.   
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End Notes 
1.  In the case of fixed rate loans, the institution recorded the cost of the instrument used to fund 
the loan and this was used to determine the cost of funds for the fixed rate loan.   The different 
rate environments, CD rates for variable rate loans and the cost of funds for fixed rate loans, 
resulted in lower margins for fixed rate loans.  
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Table 1.  Factors Hypothesized to Impact Relationship Profitability. 
Variable Variable is a function of: 
Hypothesized 
Effect 
Interest rate margin (M) 
= total earned interest 
per dollar of average 
daily loan balance 
Loan volume (ADB) 
Loan volume squared (ADB2) 
Credit risk (δ) 
Use of financial services (FS) 
Relationship length (Rel)  
Age of the borrower (Age) 
Percent of debt in lines of credit (LOC) 
Term remaining on debt (Term) 
Concentration of debt with lender (Conc) 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
- 
Servicing costs (C) = 
Personnel Costs per 
dollar of average daily 
loan balance 
Loan volume (ADB) 
Loan volume squared (ADB2) 
Credit risk (δ) 
Use of financial services (FS) 
Relationship length (Rel)  
Age of the borrower (Age) 
Percent of debt in lines of credit (LOC) 
Term remaining on debt (Term) 
Concentration of debt with lender (Conc) 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Loan Relationships Sampled by Size and Risk Class. 
   Total Outstanding Relationship Balance  
  New Small 
<$100k 
Medium 
$100-$400k 
Large 
>$400k 
Total 
Low 138 131 136 142 547 
Medium 23 99 109 93 324 R
is
k 
C
la
ss
 
Loss  XXX 55 28 9 92 
 Total  161 285 273 244 963 
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Table 3.  General Characteristics of the Borrowers. 
Characteristic Averagea Standard Deviation 
Assets $990,376 $1,577,737 
Debt to Asset Ratio 37% 25% 
Sole Proprietors 77%  
Partnerships 13%  
Corporations 10%  
Age of Primary Decision Maker 49 12.53 
Average Daily Loan Balance $128,115 $304,189 
Number of Loans 2.50 2.00 
Number of Lines of Credit 0.89 1.11 
Number of Short-term Loans 1.08 1.33 
Number of Mortgages 0.53 0.69 
Percent of ADB in Lines of Credit 31% 41% 
Percent of ADB with Fixed Rates 16% 33% 
Average Term Remaining  5.94 years 5.56 
Concentration (% of debt held by the lender) 50% 54% 
Length of Lending Relationship  8.20 8.06 
a Estimates of the population mean. 
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Table 4.  Costs and Returns of Agricultural Lending. 
Income and Cost Components  Average per 
Relationshipa 
Average Per 
Dollar of ADB 
(Basis Points)a 
Average Earned Interest Rate 7.80% 780 
Interest Margin over One-Month CD Rate  $4,389 408 
Loan Fee Income $178 24 
Financial Services Income (return over cost)  $109 22 
Loan Officer Costs $244 60 
Other Personnel Costs $134 26 
Total Personnel Costs $378 86 
Attorney and Court Costs  $8 0.5 
Write-offs and Legal Costs  $141 13 
Net Return over One-Month CD Rate $3608 309 
a Estimates of the population mean of each variable.   
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Table 5.  Description of the Independent Variables. 
Variable Description Mean 
(S.D.) 
Average Daily 
Balance (ADB) 
The customer’s total average daily loan balance.   
 
 
$274,286 
($567,485) 
Low risk borrowers Indicator variable for borrowers that are not classified by banking 
regulators or “pass” loans. Omitted from model.  
 
56% 
Medium risk 
borrowers (δ1) 
Indicator variable for borrowers classified as special mention, 
substandard, or doubtful loans. 
 
34% 
High risk borrowers 
(δ2) 
Indicator variable for borrowers with loans classified as non-accrual 
or loss.   
 
10% 
New relationship 
(New) 
Indicator variable for borrowers whose business was obtained within 
the year. 
 
17% 
Lender (Li) Set of indicator variables identifying the lending institution 
 
 
Enterprises (Enti) Set of indicator variables identifying the borrower’s primary farming 
enterprise: dairy (48%), annual crops (20%), permanent plantings 
(7%), other livestock (12%), and green industry (6%).  Other types of 
agricultural loans omitted. 
 
 
Financial services 
(FS) 
Indicator variable for borrowers that use the non-loan financial 
services offered by the institution such as checking, brokerage, 
insurance, business consulting, etc.   
 
40% 
Relationship length 
(Rel) 
The length of the lender/borrower relationship in years.   
 
8.4 
(8.4) 
Age The age in years of the borrower’s primary decision maker. 
 
48.4 
12.4 
Lines of credit (LOC) The percentage of the borrower’s total ADB that is comprised of 
lines of credit.  Recorded in percentage points, i.e., 78% is recorded 
as 78.0.   
 
24.4 
Fixed rates (Fixed) The percentage of the borrower’s total ADB that carries a fixed 
interest rate. Recorded in percentage points, i.e., 10% is recorded as 
10.0.   
 
17.7 
Term remaining 
(Term) 
The average term remaining on outstanding debt.  The average is 
weighted by the ADB of each loan. Recorded in years.   
 
6.9 
(5.8) 
Concentration (Conc) The proportion of the borrower’s total liabilities supplied by the 
lender. Recorded in percentage points.   
45.2 
(27.7) 
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 Table 6.  Parameter Estimates for Regression Models.   
Parameter  Interest Rate 
Margin 
Servicing Cost per 
Dollar of ADB 
Profitability per 
Dollar of ADB 
Intercept 486.59** 
(39.50) 
168.00** 
(27.82) 
362.57** 
(113.85) 
ADB -9.84E-05** 
(1.97E-05) 
-6.75E-05** 
(1.39E-05) 
-6.56E-05 
(5.68E-05) 
(ADB)2 1.37E-11** 
(3.40E-12) 
9.09E-12** 
(2.39E-12) 
8.91E-12 
(9.79E-12) 
Lender 1 -33.99 
(23.83) 
-24.48 
(16.79) 
-169.97** 
(68.69) 
Lender 2 14.51 
(24.88) 
1.43 
(17.52) 
-88.91 
(71.70) 
Lender 3 -28.42 
(26.52) 
-34.30* 
(18.68) 
-61.36 
(76.43) 
Lender 4 -139.79** 
(25.14) 
-22.70 
(17.71) 
-194.62** 
(72.47) 
Lender 5 253.63** 
(24.31) 
-44.01** 
(17.12) 
156.46** 
(70.07) 
F-Statistic for Lender 
Group 
83.3** 2.45** 9.35** 
Medium risk 39.06** 
(12.40) 
-3.57 
(8.74) 
32.55 
(35.75) 
High risk 83.46** 
(21.77) 
97.57** 
(15.33) 
-658.03** 
(62.75) 
F-Statistic for Risk 
Group 
9.67** 22.89** 63.13** 
New relationship (New) -1.45 
(17.33) 
59.52** 
(12.21) 
71.17 
(49.95) 
Dairy -55.12** 
(22.07) 
-12.58 
(15.55) 
-58.07 
(63.62) 
Annual Crops -22.53 
(23.30) 
-10.94 
(16.41) 
0.65 
(67.17) 
Permanent Plantings -4.02 
(29.55) 
13.08 
(20.81) 
-67.86 
(85.18) 
Other Livestock -50.01** 
(25.22) 
-1.82 
(17.76) 
-46.53 
(72.70) 
Green Industry -39.47 
(31.01) 
24.59 
(21.84) 
18.21 
(89.39) 
F-Statistic for 
Enterprise Group 
2.38** 1.33 0.64 
 
Table 6, continues. 
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Table 6. Continued. 
Parameter  Interest Rate 
Margina 
Servicing Cost per 
Dollar of ADBb 
Profitability per 
Dollar of ADBc 
Financial Services -2.95 
(13.23) 
1.21 
(9.32) 
24.86 
(38.15) 
Relationship Length 1.37* 
(0.76) 
-1.08** 
(0.54) 
1.30 
(2.19) 
Age  0.17 
(0.47) 
0.23 
(0.33) 
0.09 
(1.35) 
Concentration -0.52** 
(0.22) 
-0.98** 
(0.16) 
0.98 
(0.64) 
Percent of Debt in Lines of 
Credit 
-0.41** 
(0.19) 
0.11 
(0.13) 
-0.44 
(0.54) 
Percent of Debt with Fixed 
Terms 
-1.58** 
(0.20) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
-0.94* 
(0.56) 
Average Term Remaining 
on Debt 
-1.58 
(1.11) 
-3.47** 
(0.78) 
1.84 
(3.20) 
Model F-Statistic 31.37** 13.39** 9.86** 
R-Square 0.44 0.25 0.20 
Adjusted R-Square 0.43 0.23 0.18 
N= 901    
aInterest earned minus the cost of funds divided by the total average daily loan balance.  The 
one month certificate of deposit rate was used as an estimate of the institution’s cost of funds for 
variable rate loans. In the case of fixed rate loans, the actual cost of the instrument used to fund 
the loan was used as the cost of funds.  The variable is recorded in basis points, i.e., 7.56% is 756 
basis points. 
bThe total direct personnel costs incurred servicing the customer.  This includes time spent by 
loan officers, loan officer supervisors, credit analysts, accountants, and credit committees.  The 
cost of travel by loan officers is also included. The variable is recorded in basis points.  Costs do 
not include overhead costs such as executive salaries, administrative support, and facilities.   
cInterest rate margin minus servicing costs and write-offs, plus loan fees and net financial 
service income all divided by average daily volume.  The variable is recorded in basis points.   
*indicates significance at the 0.10 level 
**indicates significance at the 0.05 level 
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Figure 1.  The Impact of Loan Volume on Servicing Costs and Interest Rate Margin.   
 
Servicing Cost 
Interest Rate Margin 
 
